From Guardians to Gatekeepers: The European Commission’s Push for Influence in Commissioner Selection
Every five years, the focus of European public discourse shifts to something reminiscent of political TV series on streaming platforms. People are stepping down, some are bitter with decisions regarding candidate choices, others have scandals, and everyone is curious about who will be the team winning the race for powerful EU leadership positions. CVs, portfolios, hearings, votes, press conferences, political programs, confrontational rhetoric, and having more “equals among equals” in the form of vice-presidential offices are all on the table. The European elections are followed by an interesting process in European politics, the selection of the new college of commissioners. Media, think tanks, and generally, the European public is focused on the renewal of the EU’s executive body’s leadership.
Before the European elections, the focus was on who would become a member of the European Parliament, followed by the question of who would receive important positions in the leadership of the institutions. After the elections to new positions in the European Parliament are done, the renewal of the leadership of the European Commission begins. First, the president of the Commission is elected, in 2024, Ursula von der Leyen was voted into office as president-elect. Afterwards, the process continues, Member States nominate commissioner-designates, who, in practice, are also accepted by the president of the Commission. She also decides which portfolios will be set up and who will be responsible for which field. The candidates then study the briefings that they receive from the responsible DGs and prepare for a notoriously challenging grilling in front of the responsible European Parliament committees. After all the hearings are conducted, the new college of commissioners needs to be voted into office.
The current institutional cycle proves to be quite interesting from the perspective of the relationship between the EU institutions and the Member States and the EU institutions among themselves as well. There are some quite worrying signs emerging for other EU institutions than the European Commission, and for the Member States as well.
Ursula von der Leyen, the president-elect is shifting the process more and more to her favor, making up new rules that were not part of the rulebook before. In 2019, she already requested that the Member States propose two candidates, one male and one female, so that she has more leverage to assemble the members of her new college while respecting gender balance. Although the goal of increasing the number of female commissioners is admirable, especially considering how much focus the European Commission has on gender balance, there is a power play and an interesting dynamic behind the decision. It seems like Leyen is trying to increase her influence over the Member States and this year’s commissioner selection showed, that she can in fact pressure member states regarding their nominations by implying that if they do not comply with the new custom she is trying to establish, the member state in question will receive a less influential portfolio. The question of whether the nominee of a specific Member State receives a portfolio with more influence is in fact a significant incentive, which is already shown by the fact that they do not intend to give up having a commissioner and establishing a rotating system as it was foreseen during the adoption of the Lisbon Treaties.
The call for putting forward two names for the European Commission applies more pressure on smaller and less influential Member States, as one with more influence can still refuse the request and still receive a more influential portfolio. The more influential Member States received strong portfolios during both mandates of the Leyen Commission, as Germany is heading the Commission, France has the position of Executive Vice-President for Prosperity and Industrial Strategy, and Italy has the position of Executive Vice-President for Cohesion and Reforms. During the previous (still in office) mandate the European Commissioner for Internal Market was French (although he resigned recently), and the Italian commissioner was assigned an economic portfolio. A smaller Member State, however, cannot exert more pressure on account of its economic strength, or have greater influence later in all EU institutions and specifically strength in votes in the Council, or the ability to influence other Member States on later decisions, etc. Therefore the 1 male 1 female commissioner-designate principle favors “bigger” Member States, which is no wonder if we consider that Leyen comes from one of the most influential ones. Nonetheless, it did influence Member States to nominate more female candidates, as her outgoing college had the highest ratio of female commissioners to male commissioners to date (13:14). This time around the ratio is a little bit less balanced with 11 female designates (around 40% to 60%).
The Treaties do not empower the president-elect with such powers. Article 17 (7) TEU specifically outlines the procedure for appointing members of the European Commission and the new element of the procedure that was introduced by Leyen in 2019 is not written anywhere in the Treaties or in any other legal sources for that matter. Paragraph 7 establishes an interesting relationship between the Member States, the Council, and the president-elect. „The Council, by common accord with the President-elect, shall adopt the list of the other persons whom it proposes for appointment as members of the Commission. They shall be selected, on the basis of the suggestions made by Member States, in accordance with the criteria set out in paragraph 3, second subparagraph, and paragraph 5, second subparagraph.” It is the right of the Council to adopt the list of the commissioner-designates in the form of a Council decision, but it does have to consult the president-elect during the process. The question is whether this is enough legal basis for the president-elect to establish new rules in the form of customs during the procedure. Most member states did not take it into account, but there were two that decided to nominate new names in order to gain more influential portfolios. In the case of Slovenia, the official reason was a difference between the first nominee and the president-elect, but it did come with switching a male candidate to a female one. Bulgaria did put forward a male and a female name as well. Romania changed its nomination first proposing a male candidate, then a female one.
There were other instances where Leyen influenced changes in the list of nominees, like the case of Breton. According to the press, von der Leyen offered France a more influential portfolio in case they agreed to swap the commissioner-designate for another person. Breton resigned shortly after. In the case of Nicolas Schmit, the socialists argued that he should have been nominated as commissioner-designate instead of Christophe Hansen and that Leyen’s hand was in this decision as well, although it is the government who has the right to decide about the nominee according to the Treaties.
It is a valid concern whether a relatively weaker German and French leadership, a weak tandem, can outweigh the Commission when it comes to power balance. Some even raised concerns over the fact that the new college seems to be structured in a centralized way, with Ursula von der Leyen having a great influence on all politically significant decisions. The borders between the portfolios and thus responsibilities seem to be unclear, there are thoroughly planned vice-presidential roles with vague and cryptic titles. Furthermore, the previously openly critical commissioners are gone from the body, and most of the team is made up of new candidates. This leads to an even more challenging playing field for smaller Member States in the next five years.
All in all, the goal to increase gender balance is welcomed. However, one needs to make sure that there is no hidden agenda behind it and that the rights of smaller and medium-sized Member States are given due account in the next European Commission. More trust and balance between the EU institutions means more unity and thus development, helping to overcome challenges like the declining competitiveness of Europe, outlined by Mario Draghi’s recent report.
Árpád Lapu is an adviser at the Minister’s Cabinet of the Ministry of European Affairs of Hungary and an assistant research fellow at the Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary. He was a policy adviser on constitutional issues at the European Parliament between 2019-2024. In the years 2017-2019, he worked as an adviser at the Cabinet of the Minister of Justice of Hungary, conducting comparative constitutional analyses. He has earned his JD at the Pázmány Péter Catholic University in Hungary, has a BA in international relations from the University of Szeged, and an MA in European and international administration from Andrássy Gyula German Speaking University in Budapest. He has completed an LLM in international law at the Catholic University of Louvain (UCLouvain). His field of research is neutrality and non-participation in armed conflicts in international law and constitutional norms regarding permanent neutrality. He has written publications regarding the future of the EU ETS system of the European Union, institutional reform proposals and policies of the EU, and research in the field of social sciences.