Since Maslow, we have known that strong emotions — fear, anger, frustration — spread far more quickly than rational, calm dialogue. Today’s societies are dominated by social media algorithms designed to maximize attention (and thus profit), favoring divisive, emotionally charged content. As a result, people in greater numbers have been pushed toward extreme views, and social polarization has dramatically increased.

After the Second World War, a peculiar political and social balance emerged in much of the world. In Western democracies, the model of the moderate welfare state was born, blending the dynamism of the market economy with the social guarantees of state redistribution to ensure social peace and stability. This constitutional and institutional order was imbued with humanism: the ideals of human dignity, freedom, and equality. The modern system of human rights protection took shape, which became the foundation of today’s neoliberal, moderate constitutional framework. Yet today, this model seems to be running out of steam. Globalization, the technological revolution, increasingly polarized societies, and the accompanying rise of social fears have triggered processes that shake the very foundations of the moderate welfare state. This blog post seeks to answer why the constitutional order of moderate welfare states seems to be dissolving, and what kind of new era the world is drifting into.

In the aftermath of the devastation of World War II, most societies reached a consensus: peace and stability required the state to guarantee a social minimum, limit extreme inequalities, and at the same time ensure basic human rights as broadly as possible for all citizens. In Western Europe and North America, the “Keynesian compromise” took shape: the economy functioned on market principles, but the state (to a greater or lesser degree) provided unemployment benefits, access to healthcare and education, and maintained the pension system. At the same time, constitutional frameworks were built on humanist values. The separation of powers, the safeguarding of fundamental human rights, and democratic governance all aimed (and still aim) to allow societies to make the most of available opportunities and create the broadest possible well-being for their citizens. For decades, this model provided stability, prosperity, and social cohesion.

By the early 21st century, however, globalization and neoliberal economic policies had begun to undermine the essence of the moderate welfare state. The state increasingly retreated from the economy; privatization and deregulation weakened the social safety net. While this favored economic performance, it also deepened inequality. At the same time, social frustration grew: the middle class became increasingly insecure, social mobility slowed, and the income gap widened. Trust in political institutions eroded, paving the way for new populist movements, which usually proclaim to represent the interests of the many against the narrow elite — but only within the borders of the state. (These movements perhaps most closely resemble what Plato once called the “dictatorship of the many.”) The real turning point, however, was brought about by the contemporary technological revolution. Social media platforms not only offered new channels of communication but also transformed social discourse itself.

Since Maslow, we have known that strong emotions — fear, anger, frustration — spread far more quickly than rational, calm dialogue. Today’s societies are dominated by social media algorithms designed to maximize attention (and thus profit), favoring divisive, emotionally charged content. As a result, people in greater numbers have been pushed toward extreme views, and social polarization has dramatically increased.

Modern moderate democracies, built on deliberation and consensus-seeking, are thus finding it increasingly difficult to fulfill their functions, and their effectiveness is declining. The neoliberal constitutional framework simply cannot address the shifting demands brought about by radicalization, nor the reality that polarization has become a permanent feature of constitutional communities.

The neoliberal, moderate welfare state constitutional order has therefore — ironically, as a consequence of the sovereignty of the people and democratic governance — become vulnerable to social transformations driven by social media, which primarily fuel radicalization and polarization. At the same time, states have lost much of their ability to shape their societies’ identities, since public will now takes shape on platforms owned by global tech corporations(‘big techs’). Where once the state was the central actor, it has now become just one player, its influence largely dependent on economic power. Meanwhile, the world’s largest tech giants —social media platforms, search engines, AI developers — have far outgrown nation-states. Their revenues surpass the GDP of many countries, and their societal impact is often more direct than that of any government.

Whereas classical constitutional order entrusted the state with representing the public interest as an essential function, today the regulation of online spaces — and thus the shaping of public opinion — is often carried out by private companies. They decide which content is visible, which opinions are amplified, and how discourse unfolds. This “above the state” operation creates a new situation: Big Tech companies, without democratic legitimacy, now hold power positions to which the classical constitutional welfare state has been unable to respond effectively. Ironically, this phenomenon stems from the very foundations of the welfare states: in order to achieve widespread prosperity, they promoted market liberalization and the fullest possible realization of free markets — which also created the conditions for these profit-oriented giants to rise. Thus, the greatest challenge for welfare states today seems to be the consequences of the very system they themselves set in motion.

In parallel, essential state functions are weakening alongside states themselves. Think, for example, of cyber threats or the widespread disinformation campaigns against which states often prove powerless. Justice, too, as a core function of the rule-of-law-based democracies, is under strain: global economic actors are hard to hold accountable, operating across jurisdictions while exerting immense political and economic influence on states (Nepal being the most striking example today). The list could go on endlessly.

At the same time, most states have been unable — or only minimally able — to turn the rise of social media into an economic advantage. Overall, globalization has meant that state revenues grow only marginally compared to Big Tech (as transnational corporations), while social demands keep increasing, hollowing out welfare functions. The result: citizens increasingly feel that the state cannot protect them. And the weaker a state becomes in this regard, the more its classical constitutional order loses legitimacy.

The moderate welfare state was built on humanism. Human dignity, freedom, and community participation together formed the highest value around which neoliberal constitutional frameworks were built. But technological change now suggests that we are approaching a posthumanist era. By posthumanism, I do not mean the end of humanity, but rather that non-human factors — algorithms, artificial intelligences, global technological systems — are playing an ever greater role in decisions and social processes, with their primary goal not being the enforcement of human rights or the realization of well-being, but profit maximization.

This global system radically reshapes political communities: if public will and spaces of social discourse are regulated by Big Tech’s algorithms optimized for profit, then classical constitutional frameworks can no longer guarantee a political and constitutional order based on humanism. Not because these companies’ operations clash with constitutional systems, but because they act on a dimension that precedes them: they reshape the constitutional communities that are the soul of present constitutional orders.

The fears and frustrations amplified by social media benefit populist leaders. Populism thrives on offering simple, emotionally charged answers to complex problems, creating a direct link between “the people” and “the leader.” This runs counter to the constitutional logic of the moderate welfare state, which was based on institutions, checks, and balances. Populism appeals to direct expression of will rather than institutions, often resulting in new and unstable constitutional arrangements. The future therefore points to a political order where the state and the constitution play radically different roles. The question is not whether liberal, conservative, nationalist, or socialist forces dominate, nor which societal values prevail, but rather what institutional frameworks societies will adopt to address changing demands and both old and new challenges.

There is no doubt that the constitutional order of moderate welfare states is in crisis. This is not just a matter of political battles but of deep structural transformation driven by technology, globalization, and shifting social needs. It might very well be one of those “unforeseen circumstances” Schumpeter posits as part of his theory of “creative destruction “ when he talks about innovation. How we move past this or treat this is the core issue.

The real question is not whether we can return to the post-WWII humanist compromise — this is highly unlikely. Nor is it whether societies should be organized along conservative, liberal, socialist, or nationalist values. The real question is what new constitutional order will emerge, and whether it can preserve human dignity and freedom as values in a world where centers of power are no longer located only in states but also in global technological systems. The constitutional orders of the future will likely not be continuations of old models but entirely new frameworks that must respond to the challenges of Posthumanism. How well this new order will safeguard human rights, freedom, and dignity remains an open question. One thing, however, is certain: the political and social struggles of the 21^st century are no longer about liberal versus conservative values. The stakes of the transformations unfolding before our eyes are not migration, abortion, marriage, or other defining social issues, but rather how much of a role the national state will play in shaping responses to them through essential state functions — and whether future constitutional orders (and their societies!) will preserve humanism against technocratic, efficiency-driven, radical solutions.

Norbert TRIBL is attorney-at-law and senior lecturer at the International and Regional Studies Institute, University of Szeged. He received his PhD in 2020, his thesis is on the applicability of constitutional identity in the European supranational space. He is studying economics, finance and accounting from 2024. In 2023, he passed the Hungarian bar exam. As a university lecturer, he teaches State Theory and Constitutional Law. From 2025 he is member of the European Group of Public Law.