The Draft for a Corporate Sustainable Due Diligence Directive currently contains no rules on jurisdiction. This creates inconsistencies between the scope of application of the Draft Directive and existing jurisdictional law, both on the EU level and on the domestic level, and can lead to an enforcement gap: EU companies may be able to escape the existing EU jurisdiction; non-EU companies may even not be subject to such jurisdiction. Effectivity requires closing that gap, and we propose ways in which this could be achieved.

On 25 July 2024, the Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence (Directive 2024/1760) entered into force with no amendments regarding the issue of jurisdiction.

4. How to Close the Enforcement Gap – forum legis

The demonstrated lack of access to court weakens the Directive’s enforceability and creates an inconsistency between the mandatory nature of the civil liability and the lack of a firm jurisdictional basis. On a substantive level, the Directive stipulates civil liability for non-EU companies (Art. 22 CSDDD) if they are sufficiently economically active within the EU internal market (Art. 2 (2) CSDDD). Yet missing EU rules on international jurisdiction vis-à-vis third-country defendants often render procedural enforcement before an intra-EU forum impossible – even if these defendants generate significant turnover in the Union. Consequently, procedural enforcement of civil liability claims against these non-EU defendants is put at risk. The respective case law discussed does enable strategic joint litigation, but isolated actions against non-EU defendants cannot be based upon these decisions. At the same time, enforceability gaps exist with respect to EU defendants: It remains uncertain whether the courts of Member States will annul exclusive jurisdiction agreements and arbitration agreements if these undermine the application of the CSDDD.

This situation is unsatisfactory. It is inconsistent for the EU lawmaker to make civil liability mandatory in order to ensure civil enforcement but to then not address the access to court necessary for such enforcement. And it is inadequate that the (systemic) question of judicial enforceability of civil liability claims under the Directive is outsourced to the decision of the legal systems of the Member States. National civil procedural law is called upon to decide which third-country companies can be sued within the EU and how the Ingmar case law for EU domiciled companies will be further developed. This is a problem of uniformity – different national laws allow for different answers. And it is a problem of competence as Member State courts are asked to render decisions that properly belong to the EU level.

The CSDDD aims to effectively protect human rights and the environment in EU-related value chains and to create a level playing field for companies operating within the EU. This requires comparable enforcement possibilities for actions based on civil liability claims that are brought pursuant to Art. 22 CSDDD against all corporations operating within the Union. The different regulatory options the EU legislature has to achieve this goal are discussed in what follows.

Doing business jurisdiction

A rather theoretical possibility would be to allow actions against third-country companies within the EU in accordance with the former (and perhaps revived) US case law on doing business jurisdiction in those cases where these companies are substantially economically active within the EU internal market. This would be consistent with the CSDDD’s approach of stretching its scope of application based on the level of economic activity within the EU (Art. 2 (2) CSDDD). However, the fact that such jurisdiction has always been considered exorbitant in Europe and has even been largely abolished in the USA speaks against this development. Moreover, a doing business jurisdiction would also go too far: it would establish general jurisdiction, at least according to the US model, and thus also apply to claims that have nothing to do with the CSDDD.

Forum necessitates and universal jurisdiction

Another possible option would be the implementation of a forum necessitatis jurisdiction in order to provide access to justice, as proposed by the European Parliament Policy Department for External Relations, the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs and the GEDIP. However, such jurisdiction could create uncertainty because it would apply only exceptionally. Moreover, proving a “lack of access to justice” requires considerable effort in each individual case. Until now, EU law provides for a forum necessitatis only in special regulations; the Brussels I Regulation Recast does not contain any general rule for emergency jurisdiction. Member State provisions in this regard generally require a certain connection with the forum to establish such jurisdiction – the exact prerequisites differ, however, and will thus not be easily agreed upon on an EU level (see Kübler-Wachendorff).

The proposal to enforce claims under Art. 22 CSDDD by means of universal civil jurisdiction for human rights violations, which could be developed analogously to universal jurisdiction under criminal law, appears similarly unpromising; it would also go further than necessary.

Forum connexitatis

It seems more promising to implement a special case of a forum connexitatis so as to allow for  litigation of closely connected actions brought against a parent company domiciled within the EU together with a subsidiary or supplier domiciled in a third country, as proposed by the European Parliament Policy Department for External Relations and the GEDIP. This could be implemented by means of a teleological reduction of the requirements of Art. 8 (1) Brussels I Regulation Recast with regard to third-country companies, which would be an approach more compatible with the Brussels Regulation system than the implementation of a forum necessitatis provision (such a solution has, for instance, been supported by Mankowski, in: Fleischer/Mankowski (Hrsg.), LkSG, Einl., para. 342 and the GEDIP). This would simultaneously foster harmonisation on the EU level given that joint proceedings currently depend upon procedural provisions in the national law of the Member States. Moreover, this could avoid “blame games” between the different players in the value chain (see Kieninger, RW 2022, 584, 589). For the implementation of such a forum connexitatis, existing Member State regulations and related case law (Milieudefensie, Vedanta, and Okpabi) can serve as guidance. Such a forum is not yet common practice in all Member States; thus, its political viability remains to be seen. It should also be borne in mind that the implementation of a forum connexitatis on its own would only enable harmonised joint actions that were brought against EU domiciled anchor defendants together with non-EU defendants; it would not enable isolated actions against third-country companies – even if they are economically active within the EU and fall within the scope of application of the CSDDD.

Best option: Forum legis

The best way to close the CSDDD enforcement gap would be introducing an international jurisdiction basis corresponding to the personal scope of application of the Directive. The EU legislature would need to implement a head of jurisdiction applicable to third-country companies that operate within the EU internal market at the level specified in Art. 2 (2) CSDDD. Effectively, special jurisdiction would be measured on the basis of net turnover achieved within the EU. This would procedurally protect the Directive’s substantive regulatory objectives of human rights and environmental protection within EU-related value chains. Moreover, this would ensure a level playing field in the EU internal market.

Other than a forum premised on joint litigation, this solution would allow isolated actions to be brought – in an EU internal forum – against non-EU companies operating within the EU. The advantage of this solution compared to a forum of necessity is that the connecting factor of net turnover is already defined by Art. 2 (2) CSDDD, thus reducing the burden of proof, legal uncertainty and any unpredictability for the parties. Moreover, this approach would interfere less with the regulatory interests of other states than a forum necessitatis rule, which for its part would reach beyond the EU’s own regulatory space.

A forum legis should not be implemented only as a subsidiary option for cases in which there is a lack of access to justice, because this would create legal uncertainty. The clear-cut requirements of Art. 2 (2) CSDDD are an adequate criterion for jurisdiction via a forum legis. On the other hand, it should not serve as an exclusive basis of jurisdiction, because especially plaintiffs should not be barred from the ability to bring suit outside the EU. The risk of strategic declaratory actions brought by companies in a court outside the EU seems rather negligeable, and this can be avoided either by giving preference to actions for performance over negative declaratory actions, as is the law in Germany or through the requirement of recognisability of a foreign judgment, which would not be met by a foreign decision violating domestic public policy by not providing sufficient protection.

This leaves a problem, however: The CSDDD does not designate which Member State’s court have jurisdiction. Since a forum legis normally establishes adjudicatory jurisdiction correlating with the applicable law, jurisdiction lies with the courts of the country whose law is applied. This is not possible as such for EU law because the EU does not have its own ordinary courts. The competent Member State court within the EU must be determined. Two options exist with regard to the CSDDD: to give jurisdiction to the courts in the country where the highest net turnover is reached, or to allow claimants to choose the relevant court. The first option involves difficult evidentiary issues, the second may give plaintiffs an excessive amount of choice. In either case, non-EU companies will be treated differently from EU companies on the question of the competent court – for non-EU companies, net turnover is decisive in establishing the forum, for EU-companies, the seat of the company is decisive. This difference is an unavoidable consequence resulting from extension of the scope of application of the Directive to third-country companies on the basis of net turnover.

5. Implementation

How could this forum legis be achieved? The most straightforward way would be to include a rule on jurisdiction in the CSDDD, which would then oblige the Member States to introduce harmonised rules of jurisdiction into national procedural law. This would be a novelty in the field of European international civil procedure law, but it would correspond to the character of the special provision on value chains as well as to the mechanism of the CSDDD’s liability provision. An alternative would be to include in the Brussels I Regulation Recast a sub-category of a special type of jurisdiction under Art. 7 Brussels I Regulation Recast. This as well would be a novelty to the Brussels system, which in principle requires that the defendant be seated in a Member State (see also Kieninger, RW 2022, 584, 593, who favours reform of the Brussels I Regulation Recast for the sake of uniformity within the EU). This second option would certainly mesh with current efforts to extend the Brussels system to non-EU defendants (see Lutzi/Piovesani/Zgrabljic Rotar).

The implementation of such a forum legis is not without problems: It subjects companies, somewhat inconsistently with the EU legal scheme, to de facto jurisdiction merely because they generate significant turnover in the EU’s internal market. Yet such a rule is a necessary consequence of the extraterritorial extension of the Directive to third-country companies. The unilateral character of the CSDDD is problematic. But if the CSDDD intends to implement such an extension on a substantive level, this must be reflected on a procedural level so as to enable access to court. The best way to do this is by implementing a forum legis. The CSDDD demonstrates the great importance of compensation of victims of human rights and environmental damage, by making the civil liability rule internationally mandatory. Creating a corresponding head of jurisdiction for these substantive civil liability claims is then necessary and consistent in order to achieve access to court and, thus, procedural enforceability.

This post was written by Ralf Michaels and Antonia Sommerfeld, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, and published on 3 August 2023. It is also available via conflictoflaws.net and https://eapil.org/2023/08/03/the-eu-sustainability-directive-and-jurisdiction/ . A long version titled “EU-Lieferketten-Richtlinie und internationale Zuständigkeit“ is published in: Christian von Bar, Oliver L. Knöfel, Ulrich Magnus, Heinz-Peter Mansel, Arkadiusz Wudarski (Hrsg.), Gedächtnisschrift für Peter Mankowski (2024), S. 775–791, (https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/buch/gedaechtnisschrift-fuer-peter-mankowski-9783161639920/, also available as Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law Research Paper Series. No. 25/2: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5099690).

Prof. Dr. Ralf Michaels, LL.M. (Cambridge) is Director at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg, Germany, Chair in Global Law at Queen Mary University in London, and Professor of Law at the Hamburg University. Until 2019 he was the Arthur Larson Professor at Duke University School of Law; he has also been a visiting professor at the Universities of Paris II Panthéon-Assas, Princeton, Pennsylvania, Toronto, Tel Aviv, as well as the London School of Economics. Michaels holds an LL.M. from Cambridge University and a PhD in Law from Passau University. He is a widely published scholar of private international law, comparative law, and legal theory; his current research focuses on decolonial comparative law, regulatory conflicts, and theoretical foundations of private international law and global legal plurality. Michaels is a member of the Academia Europaea, the American Law Institute, the International Association of Comparative Law, and the Comparative Law Associations of the United States, Germany, and France.

Dr. Antonia Sommerfeld is a Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg, Germany, and a lecturer at the University of Hamburg. She was a visiting researcher at the University of Cambridge (U.K.) and the Kyōto University (Japan) and has taught courses at the China University of Political Science and Law in Beijing (China). She has studied law at the University of Hamburg and the Université Aix-Marseille, Aix-en-Provence (France) and holds a PhD in Law from the University of Hamburg. Sommerfeld’s main fields of research lie in the area of Private International Law and Private Law with a special focus on Contracts, Commercial Law, Sustainability and Circular Economy. She has conducted her legal traineeship (Rechtsreferendariat) working i.a. at the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations in New York (U.S.), the litigation department of an international law firm and the offices of the Research Services of the German Bundestag.