The crisis regarding Greenland shifts the focus to a deeper problem faced by European integration and specifically the CFSP, namely the lack of a clear strategy for the 21st century’s geopolitical competition, which should urgently be placed at the top of the European Council’s agenda.

Greenland has become the subject of global attention during the second presidency of Donald J. Trump. The Arctic island within the Kingdom of Denmark has only 56 542 inhabitants and yet it is at the center of geopolitical competition. There are shipping routes within its vicinity. It is vast and has many natural resources and it is in a strategic location when it comes to security and defense.

What exactly happened in US-Danish, and thus US-EU relations that led to this standoff? The US has been an important ally to Greenland and a guarantor of its security since 1951. It withdrew from the European Economic Community in 1985 and became an Overseas Country and Territory of Denmark. The EU is increasingly engaged in Greenland and has even opened an office in Nuuk in 2024. Greenland is also geopolitically situated between Moscow and Washington, the US-Greenland relationship has always been security-centered.

President Trump first expressed interest in 2019 and afterwards called upon Denmark to sell Greenland to the US in late 2024. From then on, tension rose between the EU, Denmark and the United States regarding this issue, testing even the endurance of NATO cooperation as well. The US claimed that it was necessary for national security reasons and freedom. Countering Russian and Chinese influence, military deterrence, and the use of the territory’s vast resources were among possible points of American interests as well.

The shift in the US approach is puzzling. From a European viewpoint, one can only try to piece together to try to understand this unusual crisis of Transatlantic partners.

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America from November 2025 has a chapter dedicated to Europe as partners of the US. The analysis states that Europe should prioritize „reestablishing conditions of stability within Europe and strategic stability with Russia”, and „enabling Europe to stand on its own feet and operate as a group of aligned sovereign nations, including by taking primary responsibility for its own defense, without being dominated by any adversarial power”. This leads to the conclusion that among American national interests, a certain American anxiety towards the lack of defense capability and awareness of European states was part of the many root causes of this crisis as well.

The European Parliament raised concerns about the „foreign interference in Greenland” and especially the „hybrid actions and explicit US threats to Greenland’s sovereignty, describing these as a major threat to EU strategic interests”. It urged a unified response and stated that the 2025 US National Security Strategy “formalizes a groundless US policy of considering the EU, including its fundamental values, democratic governance principles and several of its fundamental security objectives, opposed to US interests”.

In January 2026 there was a sigh of relief from the European side, as a framework deal regarding Greenland was reported to be signed. Tensions regarding Greenland seemed to be subsiding and most of the crisis seems to be averted as diplomatic solutions seem to be taking over political communication. However, the experience remains. 

What was the goal and the contemplation behind the US Greenland-policy of the White House? Was there a genuine concern for US national security, or a realpolitik interest that the most important, founding member of NATO was pursuing? Those all seem to be valid points of analysis. From a European security standpoint, however, it is important to ask, how did the EU enable this crisis to emerge, how could such a scenario be avoided?

If we consider the thought for a moment that Europe indeed needs to step up when it comes to its own security, which is a fact considering the situation of the GDP spending target, one could easily reach the conclusion that a European Union with a stronger defense policy, with a stronger deterrence and a better security policy strategy could have avoided this crisis. This line of thought mirrors the above quoted 2025 US National Security Strategy and the communication of the members of the American administration. Adopting a White Paper for European Defense was a good step towards recognizing this problem and a step towards trying to solve it.

However, there is a more fundamental question that needs to be addressed: the EU lacks a CFSP strategy that is ready for the 21st century’s geopolitical competition. It is not about another white paper or another foreign policy document; the problem is that the members of the European Council should sit at the table and debate the issue of European security in a changing world until they reach a common solution. The strategy of the EU is not well-thought through; the EU does not have an analysis comparable to the 2025 US National Security Strategy and European values and principles need to be translated into clear-cut policy frameworks for concrete actions and reactions for the next decades.

Furthermore, the common European strategy must be based on the realization that Europe needs to start to behave as it is fitting to its stature, as a great power on the international stage, one that represents the rules-based international legal order and is not afraid to use its influence once other powers do not respect it. This is in line with American and other partner’s security interests as well.

Árpád Lapu is an assistant research fellow at the Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary. He was a policy adviser on constitutional issues at the European Parliament between 2019-2024. He worked as an adviser at the Ministry of Justice of Hungary (2017-2019) and the Ministry of European Union Affairs (2024-2026), conducting EU law, international law and comparative constitutional analyses. He has earned his JD at the Pázmány Péter Catholic University in Hungary, has a BA in international relations from the University of Szeged, and an MA in European and international administration from Andrássy Gyula German Speaking University in Budapest. He has completed an LLM in international law at the Catholic University of Louvain (UCLouvain).