The 2024 Rule of Law Report of the European Commission (hereinafter referred to as RoLR) introduced some novelties, particularly as it was the first time the executive branch of the EU extended and conducted its research and monitoring system outside the borders of the integration project known as the European Union. This year, the annual RoLR—which is part of the EU’s Rule of Law toolbox, concretely it is a tool of the Rule of Law mechanism—was extended to include some potential future members under the EU’s enlargement process, namely Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. In the following article, we are going to look at how the Commission evaluated the Rule of Law (hereinafter: RoL) situation and level of the controversial West-Balkan country regarding two main parts of the RoLR, the judicial system and the checks and balances.

Historical background

The efforts to achieve Macedonian independence from under Turkish rule go back to some major uprisings in 1875, 1878, and 1893 as well as the Ilinden Uprising in 1903, all unsuccessful due to a lack of great power support. Russia aimed to incorporate the region into Bulgaria, but this was opposed by the great powers. Even the 1878 Congress of Berlin failed to grant Macedonian independence. In 1903, the short-lived Kruševo Republic was crushed by Ottoman forces. Despite further struggles, including during the Balkan Wars, Macedonia remained under Serbian control by 1912. After World War I, the region became part of Yugoslavia, and efforts to prevent uprisings involved military presence and Serbian settlement. North Macedonia, then the People’s Republic of Macedonia and five other republics and two provinces, gained partial autonomy for the first time within the Yugoslav Federation in 1945. The socialist era brought some economic and infrastructural progress. After the first multi-party elections in 1990, independence was declared in 1991, confirmed by a referendum, with 96,46% of voters in favor. The referendum proposed independence alongside potential membership in a renewed Yugoslavia, but this did not occur. North Macedonia’s ethnic composition, with Albanians comprising nearly one-third of the population, has heavily influenced its politics. The 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), following ethnic conflict, led to reforms enhancing minority rights and decentralization. Constitutional amendments that have implemented the OFA introduced dual-majority voting (so-called Badinter majority) in North Macedonia to prevent the Albanian minority from being overruled on key issues. This change, covering ethnic language use, cultural rights, and representation, required both plenary and minority support. The Inter-Ethnic Relations Council was also established. The country’s name was resolved in 2018, changing from Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to North Macedonia after a long dispute with Greece.

After this brief historical overview of North Macedonia, we will now follow the RoLR methodology, which is typically based on four pillars:

1. The justice system
2. The anti-corruption framework
3. Other institutional issues related to checks and balances
4. Media pluralism and freedom.

However, due to the limitations of the blog post format, this article will focus on two major aspects: the justice system and other institutional issues related to checks and balances. The reason behind why these two pillars were chosen is that they are deeply connected to each other, hence their valuation will be consecutive and will not break the post’s structure.

Justice system

North Macedonia’s judicial system consists of a three-tiered court structure with 27 First-Instance Courts, four Appeal Courts, and the Supreme Court, which ensures uniform application of laws and decides on appeals. An Administrative Court and Higher Administrative Court oversee the legality of public administration measures. The Prosecution is led by the Public Prosecutor, with four Higher Public Prosecutor’s Offices and 22 Basic PPOs. The Constitutional Court, separate from the judiciary, reviews the constitutionality of laws. The Judicial Council and Council of Public Prosecutors ensure judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy, while the Bar Association provides independent legal assistance.

Serious questions arise when we examine how citizens and companies perceive the independence of their country. According to the Eurobarometer survey conducted among the general public between 14 and 27 February 2024, and the Eurobarometer survey (FL541), conducted among companies between 14 February and 5 March 2024, only 25% of the general public and 20% of companies perceive the independence of courts and judges as “fairly or very good.” This reveals a systematic problem in the justice system. Comparatively, these are the worst results among the new class, with Albania leading with the highest result of 45–46%, followed by Montenegro with 35–28%.

However, if we look at the existing EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), serious concerns are also raised, according to the annual EU Justice Scoreboard (another tool of the RoL toolbox). Poland scores 28–22%, Slovakia 33%, and Hungary 41–40%. The CEE region, however, is not homogeneous, with Czechia at 50%, Romania at 52–56%, and Austria at 82–77%, showing a deeply diverse picture of the region.

The recommendation system that the Commission uses in its annual Rule of Law Report (RoLR) is not yet included in the report for North Macedonia—nor for other countries in the potential new enlargement class. The specific expectations the Commission may have for the Balkan country are more likely to emerge during the enlargement process, in press statements, and through negotiations. Since this is the first report on this country we cannot look at the possible developments or backlashes, although with the experiences of the other country chapters, it can be stated that the recommendation system needs a comprehensive reform.

Independence and functionality issues

While the Commission highlights the progress regarding the functioning and independence of the Judicial Council, this area still remains a concern. The situation and happenings within the Judicial Council in 2023 have negatively affected the public’s trust—which can be noticeable in the mentioned Eurobarometer survey—in the judiciary. Namely, a scandal relating to the Judicial Council President, who had been demoted from her role and was later reinstated following a ruling by the Administrative Court in December 2023, as it was found that her demotion was unlawful. Two Judicial Council members, as well as a previous Council President, had resigned in June 2023 in disagreement with the demotion of the President and invoking reasons of undue influence within the judiciary. These developments raised serious concerns about both the Council’s legitimacy and functionality. This ended up in an institutional problem since the majority of judges (72%) do not consider that the Judicial Council can effectively safeguard their independence.

The RoLR highlights that the independence of the judiciary, along with its institutional capacity to protect itself from undue influence, remains critical. More than one-third of judges surveyed reported facing attempts of external influence, either from the executive branch (36%) or from representatives of political parties (37%). Several high-ranking members of the judiciary, including the President of the Supreme Court, made public statements expressing their concerns over major systemic issues. A similar trend regarding undue influence can also be observed from other peers or sectors, including attorneys (35%), representatives from the business sector (35%), and members of the Judicial Council (32%) representatives from the business sector (35%). As the OSCE report highlights, compared to the findings of the OSCE’s 2009 legal analysis on judicial independence, there has been a notable rise in perceived pressure or attempts to exert influence from fellow judges (+12%), higher-ranking judges (+12%), and members of the Judicial Council (+9%). These figures suggest that, despite considerable efforts to promote judicial independence and impartial decision-making, attempts at influence have not diminished. Instead, they have increased to a concerning degree, potentially jeopardizing judicial impartiality. Such issues within the justice system could systematically undermine not only the country’s effective rule of law framework but also “the long-awaited European Union accession talks.”

With this knowledge, it is not hard to guess that the EU has highlighted judicial reforms as a key priority for North Macedonia’s accession bid. David Geer, the EU ambassador to North Macedonia, made it abundantly clear: “The justice system is at a critical point.”

Other institutional issues related to checks and balances

North Macedonia is a unicameral parliamentary democracy where the Assembly holds the legislative power and elects the Government and other high-ranking officials. The executive power is headed by the President of the Government. The President of the Republic is directly elected every five years, signs laws, and has the right to use suspensive veto power, which can be overridden by a parliamentarian majority. Every member of the Assembly, the Government, or at least 10,000 citizens have the right to propose a draft-law for adoption. The Constitutional Court is competent to assess the constitutionality and legality of the acts. The Ombudsperson, who is elected by the Assembly, is tasked with the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and assumes the function of the National Human Rights Institution. Other independent and regulatory bodies in the field of human rights include the Commission for Prevention and Protection against Discrimination and the Data Protection Agency.

To provide more context on the country’s background, it is also important to note that after the first election in 1990, citizens went to the ballot every four years until 2008. However, this trend for a while ended in 2008, and elections were held in 2008, 2011, 2014, 2016, 2020, as well as this year in 2024, although there was a partial boycott of the vote by the Albanian community.

Ineffective lawmaking

The RoLR firstly highlights the issues linked to the parliamentary procedure, as the RoLR says: “Political polarisation in Parliament has caused delays in its work and led to the excessive and sometimes inappropriate use of accelerated legislative procedures.” In light of the strong polarisation in the Sobranie—the new government formed in June 2024, is based on a coalition of 22 parties—, challenges remain in terms of efficiently planning in the lawmaking process. The political deadlock of parliamentary work last year, including the lack of dialogue, has led to delays in the parliament’s legislative agenda, and in important appointments, including for judges to the Constitutional Court, and Deputy Ombudspersons.

Another important issue connected to parliamentary procedure, namely the increasing misuse of shortened parliamentary procedures and in particular, the so-called “EU flag” procedure. The “EU flag” procedure is one of four parliamentary processes (Regular, Urgent, Shortened, and EU Flag) used to transpose EU acquis into national law. Laws under this procedure are handled by the European Affairs Committee in Parliament, instead of being reviewed by the committee typically responsible for the subject matter. This approach is intended to streamline the legislative process for EU-related matters, ensuring faster compliance with EU regulations.

The “EU flag” procedure aims to expedite compliance with EU regulations but has been misapplied in cases unrelated to the EU acquis. Notably, amendments to the Criminal Code, which introduced lower penalties for corruption, were criticized by the EU Commission for undermining high-level corruption cases. Similar inappropriate applications occurred in laws on labor relations, expropriation, urban planning, construction, and highways, raising concerns about the integrity of the legislative process and alignment with EU standards.

Civic space

Civic space as an important pillar of this section is overly under-discussed in the RoLR, since it takes not more than one paragraph, although many issues appeared on this matter. According to CIVICUS Monitor, North Macedonia’s civic space is rated as “narrowed”, on a five-category scale defined as: open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed, and closed. Civil society organizations (CSOs) in North Macedonia operate in a generally enabling environment, but challenges remain for sustainable engagement in policymaking. Although the government recognizes CSOs as vital to democracy and has adopted a Strategy for Cooperation with Civil Society (2022-2024), implementation issues persist. The Council for Cooperation, intended to facilitate CSO involvement, convened only four times in 2022. There has been a notable decline in cooperation, characterized by a lack of meaningful and formal communication. CSOs have boycotted the Council since March 2022, asserting that the government’s disregard for key recommendations has rendered its work ineffective. This boycott was prompted by a decision to reduce funding for many organizations, raising significant concerns about transparency and alignment with strategic objectives.

Conclusion

While the expansion of the territorial scope of the new RoLR is a significant development, many experts, including academics and NGOs, are advocating for an extension of its scope in a material sense as well. Applying the RoLR methodology to cover the shared values, “the three core values” mentioned in Article 2 (TEU), such as democracy (including electoral minimum standards), fundamental rights (monitoring systematic violations of fundamental rights), and the existing rule of law framework of the EU together would provide a more comprehensive picture of the rule of law framework in any country. This could also potentially broaden our comprehensive understanding of the situation in North Macedonia, a candidate for EU accession since 2005.

As international politics and geopolitics continue to shift, and with the increasing importance of EU enlargement, the case of North Macedonia remains critical. Despite these growing geopolitical imperatives, significant concerns persist regarding North Macedonia’s preparedness, especially as the EU itself faces challenges in adequately integrating some of its existing members. Therefore, extending RoLR to a deeper examination of systemic rights violations could enrich our understanding and improve the EU’s approach to both existing member states and candidate countries such as North Macedonia.

Soma BÁCSFALVI is a Msc student of law at the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of the University of Szeged, Hungary, and a scholarship student of the Aurum Foundation. As a former intern with the presidential cabinet of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, his research focuses on the interconnections of national constitutional law and European public law, in particular on the rule of law and its manifestations in the European Union.