US federalism has been and still is an inexhaustible source of inspiration for the EU creators and supporters. Starting with the original vision of Altiero Spinelli in his Ventotene Manifesto to federalize Europe based on a constitution, along the lines of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 as best practice, continuing to the current FAEF Citizens’ Convention the Group of 55+, the idea of ​​copying American federalism on EU soil is the subject of ongoing debate, and there are louder thoughts of its “institutionalization” within the Union. In essence, the authors of the Manifesto developed their analysis on the thesis that the crisis of the national state was an evil in the time in which it appeared, and therefore the European federation was the only way to bring the humanity back on the progressive track. The concept of crisis of the national state, which occupies the central place in the federalist theory, also dominates as a central concept in the crisis of the capitalism and served as a threat in the time of both world wars as an introduction to a totalitarism.

The main message of the Ventotene manifesto is the creation of a European federation to which national to supranational institutions should transfer considerable power.  

Parallel with the declarations in the Manifesto, the Philadelphia Convention was federalist inspiration which also played a very important role in the process of promoting the idea for European federalism. The Philadelphia Convention brought to surface two key issues about the further development of the US, the question about the federalism and the question about the republicanism.   

Unlike the previous American confederal union, which lacked efficiency and capability to execute its laws directly toward the citizens, the federal government, in accordance with the 1787 US Constitution, gained executive and judicial instruments with a compulsory effect.

According to the federalists, the integration of Western European countries into a single federal entity is a consequence of pre-arranged political decisions made by politicians and nations, based on common political and social-economic interests and goals. Referring to the Weiler views, a common federal state with a horizontal and vertical separation of powers should be created, which the national governments of the Member States would delegate powers to, with its own Constitution. Some scholars consider that the EU is already a federal structure, or at least a quasi-federal one. There is a catalog of competencies, a Parliament with legislative power elected by its citizens (the EU has a citizen’s chamber (the European Parliament) and so-called state’s chamber (the EU Council).

However, in order to properly speak about federalism, the EU still need crucial elements, like, European demos and the existence of primary sovereignty, democratic legitimacy of all its institutions, the capability to raise taxes in order to finance the exertion of its competencies, and the ability to act effectively in the international sphere. What the EU lacks, in a federalist sense, is genuine sovereignty and a true European demos.

Formally speaking, autonomous units within the federation should give up most of their sovereignty and be subject to the common sovereignty of the institutions of the federal entity. Federalism is defined as a way of solving the traditional differences between sovereign states by overcoming the domination of some states over others and transferring some of their sovereign rights to the supranational community. Hence, sovereignty is neither indivisible nor understood as an exclusively defined term, but the emphasis is placed on the transfer of state sovereignty and the joint bodies that use this transferred sovereignty for the benefit of the community.

The questions – what do we mean by Federal Europe, is the EU already a Federation, is the federal method the only way to achieve integration and is European federalism the most (un)desirable approach to European integration arouses profound interest among the constitutional scholars and politicians. According to many authors, federations are ‘compound’ systems in which decisions are made slowly and complicated. As Vivien Schmidt has pointed out, the federal decision-making process require the articulation of particular “coordinative discourses” which tend to produce ‘joint decision traps’ because the complicated equilibriums needed to reach any decision are quickly superseded by new circumstances to which, it is too difficult to adapt.

The issue of introducing an EU federation is still very current and alive considering the official statements of the leaders of the older EU Member States, but also following the initiatives coming from expert and civil communities, especially after the defeat of the idea of creating a single European constitution. Whereas federalists constantly remind us that the Union is a collection of different national and political identities that resembles the American Federation, the question of whether and to what extent American federal elements can be fully applied in the EU is crucial for the Union’s political development.

In addition to the comparison between the European and the American federalism, a key remark in determining the need for a federation in the EU should be the conclusion that where the federated units represent distinct nationalities, they will regard themselves as sovereign and self-determining, and their leaders will use the European institutions as a way of expanding their powers and undermining the state.

Ironically, federalism tends to function most effectively in relatively homogeneous societies —precisely where it might appear least necessary. Having in mind that the federal unit is never corresponding to only one nationality group, the other conclusion could be that a possible EU federation might create new groups within the new units, leading to the never-ending process of divisions in the Union. Principle of federalism or the process of creating new federation could not be seen as a definitive solution for solving the political conflicts of any kind in the Union.

The EU federation might be seen as a contribution to smoother political accommodation among the Member States, but only under the following preconditions.

1. The first precondition is accepting the fact that introducing the EU federation is an issue of institutional design. It will be possible to address this institutional issue at the moment when the institutions of the Union will be completely democratized through the return of the traditional democratic principles – the rule of law, respect for human rights and the division of powers. For now, the EU cannot brag with strong rule of law, nor with consistent respect for human rights and true separation of powers. These key shortcomings in the EU institutions require a new strategic approach, which cannot be found in the federation, but in the strengthening of the democratic capacities of the Union.

The Federation as a new institutional design of the Union can fit into the system only when the existing institutions are strengthened to the point of overcoming all current problems. For now, the institutions of the Union are not up to the task. One gets the impression that instead of solving the Union’s institutions’ problems, they are creating new ones. For example, if the key problem in the EU is inconsistent respect for the principle of the rule of law due to the obvious deformation of division of power, as well as selectivity in the respect and protection of the human rights, the federation cannot be seen as a solution, but as an additional burden for the Union. The federation will not be able to cover the accumulated problems, or it will put them under the carpet, but will not solve them.

The existing two modes of decision-making, the supranational for the issues from the area of the single market policies and the intergovernmental decision-making regime for CSP policiesare very obviously pushing the European Parliament to the institutional margin through the strong and joint activity of the European Council, the Council of the EU and the European Commission, institutions that have predominantly executive powers and are without electoral legitimacy.

Modern federations are usually fully representative democracies. They can be made and transformed only with the consent of its citizens – in their dual role as citizens of the individual states and as citizens of the current, or future federation. While in the past federations were known as a structure for the interests of the governing elites, today they involve in their making and functioning every citizen.    

• The second prerequisite is certainly related to overcoming the well-known problem with the adoption of the EU constitution. The federalization of the EU is closely related with the adoption of the EU constitution which was rejected in the past as an inadequate project by several older EU member states (France and the Netherlands).

If the EU constitution was rejected in 2004, how would such a project be attractive now? What has essentially changed in the Union to alter the perception of the French or Dutch citizens about this joint political-legal act?

• The third precondition is related to the past federal experiences in the world, which show that federations have never been created as a result of the so-called organic evolution of the systems, but they are the result of a deliberative choice of the political elites, and this choice must be in accordance with the will of the citizens. Hence, the evolution of the Union so far cannot be considered either a factor or a criterion for the justification of the EU federation.

According to many considerations, federal unions are very fragile political projects that require a strong focus on compromise, namely a compromise between the leaders and a compromise between the citizens of the member states of the Union based on common values and goals. And these common values and goals bring us back to the first prerequisite which must be fulfilled without reservation – restoring the authenticity of the rule of law and the human rights and freedoms protection.

Throughout the history federations in Europe never proved successful as they did in the America’s.  The cases of the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the USSR etc. go in context of this conclusion. Today many of the countries coming from these federations are EU Member States. Collective memory of the generations who lived at the time of these federations might have a negative implication on the future federalist tendencies in the EU. Therefore, any ideas or processes in favor of classic EU federation must consider these lessons learned in the past.    

Instead of emphasizing the concept of the EU Federation, the EU authorities have to focused on implementation of the directly deliberative polyarchy inside the “Europe of Nations” model. This system should be based on learning from nations diversity and live with the nations diversity transforming an obstacle to closer integration into an asset for achieving it.

The dialogue is the essence of the deliberative polyarchy and the decision-making in that system is possible only through discussion and disclosure. The dialogue must be continuously focused not only on the EU institutional architecture, but on the overall quality of life and economic security of the European nations.

Prof. Tanja Karakamisheva-Jovanovska is a Full Professor at the Faculty of Law “Iustinianus Primus”, Skopje, on the Scientific Department for Constitutional Law and Political System and Former Macedonian Member of the Venice Commission, co-author of relevant Commission’s opinions. She is an author of more than 250 papers published in domestic and international scientific journals, thematic proceedings, a collection of papers, etc. She has participated in more than fifty seminars, world congresses, and international conferences around the world with papers, policy papers, or studies. She is the author of 13 textbooks (2 written in English), four scientific-popular books, and five monographs. In 2023 she was a visiting professor at the Central European Academy in Budapest, Doctoral studies, and in 2018 she was a visiting professor at the Faculty of Law and Administration in Katowice, Poland.