The geopolitical challenges of the 21st century, particularly the rise of digital disinformation and covert attempts at political influence, have forced several countries to review their approach to foreign influence. I have previously described how this has manifested itself in the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, and Hungary. In this article, I will continue to focus on the Anglo-Saxon world, specifically Australia.

Australia’s Foreign Influence Act: Background

A major catalyst in creating the framework was the 2017 resignation of Labor Senator Sam Dastyari. It was revealed that he had accepted donations from Chinese billionaire Huang Xiangmo to pay legal and travel bills and subsequently advocated for China’s position on the South China Sea, contradicting his own party’s policy. Most damagingly, Dastyari reportedly warned Huang that his phone might be tapped by intelligence agencies. The then Prime Minister Turnbull stated that ‘foreign powers are making unprecedented and increasingly sophisticated attempts to influence the political process, both here and abroad’. That was the reason why the Australian government proposed a bill for a FARA-like legislation in 2018.

The purpose of the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme (FITS) is to provide the public with visibility of the nature, level and extent of foreign influence on Australia’s government and politics.

The primary objective of the FITS Act is to provide the public and decision-makers with visibility into the nature and extent of foreign influence on Australia’s government and political processes. Unlike traditional espionage laws that focus on illegal acts, FITS targets legitimate but covert influence. As former Prime Minister Turnbull famously noted, “sunlight is the best disinfectant,” suggesting that foreign influence is not inherently harmful, provided it is transparent.

Influence or Interference?

The legislation distinguishes between “legitimate foreign influence” and “malicious foreign interference.” Kristine Berzina, and Etienne Soula write that “[t]he lack of a common understanding of what interference is can lead to the conflation of acceptable government activities, such as public diplomacy, with unacceptable acts of interference. A clearer definition can draw the lines of permissibility, protect core democratic values, and give governments the tools to establish norms in this space.” The quoted study rightly pointed out that there is a significant difference between foreign influence and foreign interference. Influence can naturally be a tool of diplomacy, which is permissible as it allows alliances or other associations to be formed. This is a part of everyday life and these terms in English also have an enormous difference.

According to the Cambridge dictionary the term “to interfere” means to involve yourself in a situation when your involvement is not wanted or is not helpful. An “influence” is the power to have an effect on people or things, or a person or thing that is able to do this. The term of interference has a negative and also a stronger meaning than the influence.

Foreign Interference in Australia

In connection with malign interference the legislature accepted the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Bill 2018. The law primarily amended the Criminal Code Act 1995 and served to modernize and expand Australia’s national security framework through several key mechanisms:

• Espionage and Foreign Interference: The reforms introduce more rigorous espionage offenses and criminalize covert foreign interference intended to undermine domestic political, governmental, or democratic processes.
• Sabotage and Infrastructure Protection: Existing sabotage laws are replaced with provisions targeting conduct that damages critical infrastructure or prejudices national security
• Economic and Democratic Security: The legislation establishes a new offense for the theft of trade secrets on behalf of foreign powers and strengthens treason laws to prevent the use of force or intimidation against democratic rights.
• Secrecy and Information Integrity: Comprehensive updates were made to secrecy offenses across the Crimes Act 1914 and the Criminal Code, including aggravated penalties for providing false information during security clearance processes
• Transparency and Alignment: Consequential amendments to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 and the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act (FITSA) ensure that investigative powers and definitions regarding political lobbying and influence are consistent across the legal landscape

Foreign Influence

The scheme requires individuals or entities to register if they undertake certain activities—such as parliamentary lobbying, general political lobbying, or “communications activities”—on behalf of a foreign principal (foreign governments, political organizations, or related entities)

• Registration requirement: Individuals and organizations that engage in certain activities on behalf of a “foreign principal”—such as a foreign government, foreign political party, or state-controlled company—must register in a public database.
• Activities covered: These include lobbying parliament, general political lobbying, communications activities (media, campaigns), and financial disbursements. The law has a very long section on definitions, which attempts to specify the activities covered, but even so, the concepts are too broad.

The FITS does not prohibit foreign states from participating in Australian public life but makes it subject to public registration. The basic philosophy of the law is that voters have the right to know if a foreign power is behind a political message or lobbying effort.

The purpose of the law is to prevent foreign powers from secretly shaping Australian public opinion or influencing legislation through front organizations, thereby ensuring that political decisions reflect Australian national interests alone, so that the will of the voters is represented by their elected representatives, and foreign interests do not shape the will of Australian decision-makers.

Critiques and Controversies

Even though the law in principle protects democracy and sovereignty—including external sovereignty, such as decision-making free from influence, and popular sovereignty, ensuring that the will of Australian voters prevails over foreign interests—, it has been criticized since its introduction by legal advocacy organizations, the academic sphere and civil society actors for the following:

1. Broad definitions: Critics argue that the concepts of “foreign principal” and “political influence” are so broad that they could force even harmless academic collaborations or charitable organizations to register.
2. Chilling effect: Civil society organizations fear that the complex administrative burden and severe criminal penalties (including imprisonment) will deter human rights defenders working with foreign partners from participating in public affairs. If individuals fear that participating in an international conference or receiving a grant from a foreign university necessitates registration as a “foreign agent,” they may opt for self-censorship. This creates a tension between the state’s duty to protect sovereignty and the constitutional protection of implied freedom of political communication.
3. Effectiveness issues: A 2024 parliamentary review found that the system was “underperforming”. There were relatively few registrations compared to expectations, and authorities had difficulty enforcing the rules against truly covert, malicious actors.

Fortunately, in 2024 the FITS was amended in some ways to allow for exemptions in order to not to harm the NGO’s who cannot be considered as politically active organisations . As we can see the Australians face the same problems with this framework like the US, the UK or Hungary. The problems and the critiques are very similar.

Conclusion

The main title of the paper – Let the Sunshine In – was borrowed from the famous song in H.A.I.R. (the musical), and two partial lines in the lyrics also are appropriate for the conclusions: As many nations globally, Australia may also have introduced these rules amid fears of “facing a dying nation” and in the hopes of “listening for the new told lies” coming from foreign powers, sowing discord.

Faced with new challenges, states are seeking real solutions to counter foreign influence and interference, but so far, in every country where such measures have been introduced, they have provoked similar negative reactions among the population.

In the Anglo-Saxon countries, lobbying has a long tradition, which is why it is the first area that these countries want to regulate transparently to prevent corruption and foreign influence. In addition, these countries also have their own lobbying laws, which provide further guarantees to voters in terms of promoting political transparency.

Through FITS, Australia rightly let the sunshine in. The regulatory framework represents a sophisticated attempt to codify the boundaries of legitimate political engagement in an era of globalized influence. By framing transparency as a prerequisite for democratic legitimacy, FITS also provides a necessary mechanism for identifying foreign actors in the domestic sphere. Currently the ongoing challenge remains ensuring that the pursuit of transparency does not inadvertently erode the very democratic freedoms—such as association and expression—that the state seeks to defend. Although its underlying principles—transparency and sovereignty—enjoy widespread support, finding a balance between practical implementation and civil liberties remains a serious challenge for legislators.

Gergely Kerkovits is a law graduate and PhD student of the Péter Pázmány Catholic University in Budapest. He is writing his doctoral dissertation on the relationship between civil society organizations and the state. His research focuses on freedom of association, sovereignty protection, public consultation, fundamental rights protection in international organizations. He is also a junior researcher of the MCC Public Law Center and intern at the Constitutional Court of Hungary.