The post explores the debate over limiting the voting rights of Member States joining the European Union during its enlargement. Although under the EU’s founding treaties, new members receive full rights upon accession, a new proposal suggests that the veto right should be temporarily restricted until institutional reforms – such as the introduction of the broadest possible use of qualified majority voting – are implemented. While these measures aim to improve decision-making efficiency, they raise legal and ethical concerns regarding the equality of Member States and trust in EU institutions. This, in turn, highlights the tension between deeper integration and the fundamental principles of the EU.

What is joining the EU all about?

The European Union has been a peace project from the very beginning. European integration, which was originally based on economic cooperation, has over time evolved into what we now know as the European Union, thanks to the policy of spillover competences. In the course of the integration, which has been gradually transforming into an increasingly political union, the admission of new Member States has always served to further deepen cooperation. The enlargement of the EU has, in fact, contributed significantly to the spread of stability, peace and prosperity across the continent.

Accession to the European Union brings mutual benefits for both the acceding country and the EU as a whole. In an acceding country, for example, joining the single market leads to a boost in trade, while from the EU’s perspective it is also advantageous, as European companies gain greater expansion opportunities and access to the market of the new Member State, which provide significant economic benefits.

Practically any European state can join the European Union, provided that it meets the convergence criteria and its accession is unanimously approved by the Member States. When, at the end of the accession process, the accession treaty is signed and ratified by all Member States, the acceding country becomes a full member of the EU from the date specified in the treaty. This means from that moment on it enjoys the same rights and bears the same obligations as all other Member States, as set out in the accession treaty.

New challenges, new solutions?

A new concept that moves beyond the above-mentioned traditional practice has emerged on the agenda of the EU institutions. According to this proposal, new countries could join the European Union without full voting rights. The plan is that these Member States would acquire full status – and thus full voting rights – only once the EU has reformed its operational framework to make it more difficult for individual Member States to exercise political vetoes. This would require amendments to the founding treaties, which, however, must be approved by all current Member States.

According to these plans, newly acceding countries would enjoy many of the benefits of the European Union, but they would not possess the right of veto. This arrangement would be maintained, according to the proposal, until the necessary institutional reforms are implemented – such as the introduction of qualified majority voting in most policy areas. From a legal perspective, this approach can only operate on a temporary basis and with a precise deadline, otherwise, legal proceedings (CJEU) may be initiated for violation of equal treatment.

It is obvious that the EU’s expansion would pose challenges to its institutional structure and decision-making, given that achieving unity is already very challenging with the current 27 Member States. However, if a Member State’s voting rights were limited or withdrawn, this would contradict the EU’s founding treaties, which states that all Member States are equal. It is clear that the reasoning behind this decision lies in the growing debate surrounding the increasing use of the veto in recent times. The veto is a right that allows a Member State to block decisions requiring unanimity if those decisions conflict with its national or constitutional interests. Withdrawing this right raises another concern considering the EU’s founding treaties – specifically, it calls into question Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union, which states: “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties […]”

Furthermore, if a Member State’s right of veto can be withdrawn, this raises another essential issue – namely Article 4(3), which regards the principle of sincere cooperation as a fundamental requirement. Indeed, if the institutions of the European Union and the Member States do not mutually respect and assist each other in fulfilling their obligations arising from the Treaties but instead apply a kind of double standard by depriving certain Member States of equal treatment, then the public trust placed in the Union’s institutions deteriorates.

But what truly lies behind this proposal? Just think about it – a new nation joins the European Union and transfers a significant part of its sovereignty to the community level; however it does not enjoy the rights designed to protect its own interests. It is like buying into a company without receiving the shares for it, and with it, all those rights that would enable the shareholders to protect their investments. This creates a vulnerable situation in which the EU institutions may admit new states (in order to increase their ‘registered capital’) and benefit from the advantages of an expanded market, while being able to operate independently of the affected Member States (i.e. shareholders). This is because the ultima ratio safeguard – the final instrument available to states, namely the right of veto at the ‘shareholders meetings’ – would effectively be removed from their toolbox.

The number of agreements concluded among Member States based on the requirement of unanimity is steadily decreasing, even though the globalized world demands swift and effective responses from European leaders as well. The Russo-Ukrainian war and Donald Trump’s re-election have redrawn the global political map. For Europe to restore its competitiveness and its overall attractiveness, it needs to be able to provide efficient and rapid responses to emerging global challenges. All of this is significantly affected by the increasingly prevalent differences within the European Union and the resulting lack of consensus.

Marta Kos, Commissioner for Enlargement, stated: “I don’t want to go down as the commissioner bringing in the Trojan horses who will be then active in 5, 10 or 15 years.” She also said that the Commission is working on ideas such as a “transition period; a kind of probation; safeguards,” although she added that these are still at an early stage. It has also turned out that the Commission is working on more efficient mechanisms to suspend rights or benefits of a Member State if core values are violated and a country could potentially be kicked out of the club in case of repeated breaches.

The European Commission is therefore visibly seeking to achieve decision-making efficiency and to eliminate the requirement of unanimity through strong instruments that, in certain cases, are capable of bypassing those Member States that oppose the majority position.

What could be the consequences of all this?

The proposal would significantly affect the current Member States as well, since it does not merely entail the withdrawal of veto rights from the acceding Member States, but also involves a complete reconsideration of the entire EU decision-making mechanism. This means transforming the requirement of unanimity into qualified majority voting in as many areas as possible – and, in addition, the complete abolition of the right of veto.

As was mentioned above, the admission of new Member States has always served to further deepen cooperation in Europe. If we start from the guiding principle that serves as a compass for the European institutions – namely the ever-closer union – it becomes entirely clear what considerations lie behind the proposal. The only question is how the Member States will respond to this approach, and whether it is conceivable that all of them would unanimously stand behind such a change.

Such an amendment would inevitably lead to extremely difficult questions. Will every Member State agree to allow decisions to be made over their heads by other countries pursuing their own interests? Will they consent to this amendment to the accession of new Member States whose participation could pose risks to national economies? And will everyone support a system in which the EU budget – and thus the allocation of funds – could, in certain cases, completely bypass national interests?

Balázs Péter Fekete is a policy adviser at the Office of the National Assembly and a PhD student at Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary. He earned his JD at the same university. Previously, he served as a policy adviser in the European Parliament on civil liberties, justice, and home affairs. His research focuses on the concept of immaterial public order in constitutional and EU law.