On September 10 2025, Verfassungsblog published To Uniformity and Beyond. Hungary’s Supreme Court and the Implementation of CJEU Rulings. The article raised important questions about how Hungarian judicial institutions interact with the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the framework of preliminary references – a topic of fertile conversation in academia. Without engaging with every aspect of that debate, I focus here[1] on a narrower but decisive issue: how the binding force of precedent operates in the Hungarian legal order when confronted with EU law.

The dilemma raised by the article can perhaps be most clearly grasped through Wagner’s Nibelungenlied. The drama of Brünhilde, Günther, and Siegfried shows that power is never identical with its appearance. Brünhilde embodies law itself, yet her strength does not yield to Günther, who outwardly seems her rightful master, but only to Siegfried’s intervention. In the same way, the CJEU may declare the primacy of EU law, but such pronouncements remain declaratory unless the national judge gives them effect.

The binding force of precedent within the Hungarian legal order can be undone only by the Kúria’s Uniformity (Complaint) Panel (UP), just as Brünhilde’s strength could be broken only by Siegfried. The unity of law, therefore, does not rest in the formal word, but in the institutional act that translates appearance into reality, and it is in this tension between declaration and force that the true drama of European law unfolds.

My reflection aims not to dispute the principle of primacy itself, but to illuminate how the reality of binding force unfolds within the institutional and constitutional framework of the Hungarian judiciary.

On the uniformity decisions

Before turning to the historical roots, a recent example illustrates the weight of uniformity decisions in practice. In the context of the C-630/23 judgment concerning foreign currency loans, the UP normally operates in two panels of 20 judges each. However, in this case the Civil Law Chamber also joined in adjudication, and a total of 42 judges adopted Uniformity Decision No. 10/2025. By contrast, in Luxembourg the chamber deciding C-630/23 consisted of only three judges from Greece, Ireland, and the Netherlands, assisted by an Advocate General from Luxembourg, all from eurozone countries where the issue of foreign-currency-denominated loans does not arise.

This contrast shows how the Hungarian mechanism is designed to ensure legitimacy and depth in sensitive fields of law. Hungarian law also allows dissenting opinions to be attached to uniformity decisions, although they carry no binding force.

Historical and constitutional foundations

While this recent example demonstrates how uniformity decisions (UDs) operate in practice, their significance cannot be fully understood without considering their historical roots and the constitutional principles that underpin them. Firstly, it should be noted that the institution of UDs in the Hungarian legal order is not unprecedented. As early as 1881 (4. §), the Curia Regia safeguarded uniform jurisprudence, a role reinforced in 1890 and codified in the 1912 Act LIV (70. §), which made UDs binding on all courts. After the transition, in 1997, this function was elevated to a constitutional level. UDs are thus not a result of EU membership, but a long-standing element of Hungary’s legal tradition. Consequently, the operational principles of UDs, embedded in national tradition, constitute an integral element of Hungary’s constitutional identity and cannot be interpreted as if they had arisen only after EU membership (See: Balássy).

Secondly, it should be noted that, under a broad interpretation of Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) of the Constitutional Court (CC), uniformization of judicial practice as an institution can also be understood as an instrument for preserving constitutional identity. In this decision, the CC established two principal limits. Firstly, the joint exercise of competences may not infringe the sovereignty of Hungary. Secondly, it may not entail a violation of constitutional identity. In line with this, the concurring reasoning attached to the majority decision emphasises that constitutional identity already existed prior to accession, and that the Accession Treaty cannot be interpreted as if Hungary had renounced it. It follows that the practice of UDs is not merely a technical tool of legal application, but an institution of Hungarian acquis constitutionnel (an historical achievement, if you will), serving as one of the safeguards of Hungarian state sovereignty and constitutional identity.

Interaction with EU law and judicial independence

A particular feature of the Hungarian limited precedent system is that lower courts can, with appropriate and detailed reasoning, depart from the legal interpretation laid down in decisions of the Kúria carrying precedential value. This model simultaneously secures the maintenance of uniformity and the preservation of judicial independence, since the binding force of an interpretation does not exclude the development of a professionally substantiated but divergent legal view. The CJEU has also recognised the functioning of this legal institution in this form. In Global Ink Trade, the Court stated in paragraph [30] that national legislation which merely requires lower national courts to provide reasons for any departure from such assessments is not contrary to that principle.

In the Hungarian system, the decisions of the UP are in all cases linked to concrete, individual disputes, brought before the panel either at the request of the parties or at the initiative of the adjudicating judicial panel, as well as of persons designated in Section 33 of the Bszi. (Act CLXI of 2011, on judicial organization). This feature ensures that UDs [Bszi., Sections 25, 40, and 41/D(5)] are not issued merely as abstract, general guidelines but are adopted within the framework of a specific legal dispute, tailored to the facts and the precise legal question at stake.

Under Hungarian law, UDs do not address the content of EU law, as this competence remains with the CJEU. Lower courts and the panels of the Kúria are entitled to refer to the CJEU if they consider a UD to be contrary to EU law, as indeed occurred in the present case. Furthermore, if they deem the CJEU’s interpretation to differ from that contained in a UD, they may disregard the UD and follow the CJEU’s interpretation, even though both are binding. This conflict can be resolved through the system of remedies, which I will explain below.

Furthermore, this situation – in line with the reasoning in RS [C-430/21, para. 44] and the opinion of AG Villalón in Case C-173/09 – is not in itself contrary to EU law, since the independence of the supreme court is guaranteed and the system does not exclude the possibility of initiating preliminary ruling proceedings if necessary. The CJEU itself confirmed in Dunai [Case C-118/17 (65) 2] that binding decisions of a supreme court aimed at ensuring uniform interpretation are not precluded by Union law, provided they do not obstruct either the full effectiveness of the directive’s rules or the jurisdiction of national courts to secure effective judicial protection and, where necessary, to make a reference for a preliminary ruling.

Therefore, the limited precedent system does not hinder courts from giving effect to the primacy of EU law. On the contrary, it reinforces it. If the Kúria observes that one of its previous binding decisions conflicts with a more recent interpretation of EU law by the CJEU, it immediately adapts its own practice to EU law. This has an instant effect, due to the binding force of UDs, making it unmistakably clear to the parties that earlier Hungarian court decisions incompatible with EU law can no longer be relied upon in pending cases. Accordingly, the Kúria’s activity in ensuring uniformity does not conflict with the primacy of EU law, insofar as it does not purport to provide an interpretation of EU law. Rather, in applying national law and showing how EU principles are incorporated into the domestic legal order, it defines the framework for adjudication without itself interpreting EU law.

Hierarchy preserved, primacy secured

This division of competences also shapes the preliminary ruling mechanism. Only questions of interpretation or validity of EU law may be referred to the CJEU, not questions regarding the legitimacy of the national judicial organisation, the remedy system, or the allocation of competences, as this would already be ultra vires. UDs do not contain autonomous interpretations of EU law. Instead, within the framework of Hungarian law, they may indirectly reflect principles derived from EU law. It follows from this specific feature that a UD of the Kúria does not interpret EU norms as independent sources of law, but, embedded within the Hungarian legal system, may show how domestic regulation already implements the requirements of EU law. AG Bobek highlighted in Euro Box Promotion (C-357/19 and C-547/19) that lower courts may disregard the Kúria’s binding view if it contradicts EU law. However, this empowerment is limited, as its sole purpose is to enable a reference to the CJEU for the interpretation of EU law and to ensure that such a right is not obstructed by formal hierarchical instruments. The result is a framework that preservesjudicial hierarchy while safeguarding the primacy of EU law. In this sense, UDs operate as part of the remedies system: they do not transpose CJEU rulings but provide the tool to remove conflicting domestic precedents when parties invoke their right to appeal.

Uniformity Through Remedies

The hierarchical structure of the judicial system is based on the right of the parties to legal remedies. The task of ensuring uniformity is vested in the supreme judicial forum. This guarantees that judicial practice remains consistent nationwide. If a lower court departs from this framework, the system of remedies, exercised through appeals, ensures that the divergent decision is annulled.

While the imperative formulation of the uniformity decision in statutory law is binding, it does not in itself entail immediate negative consequences, just as an instruction issued in a higher court’s judgment is binding yet does not of itself impose a direct sanction. If a lower court fails to follow the adjudicative framework set by the higher court, this does not automatically result in adverse consequences. The remedial mechanism is only activated if the parties consider that the judgment departs from uniform judicial practice or from the framework set by the higher court, and therefore lodge an appeal. In such cases, the higher court, upon request of the parties, annuls the decision that failed to comply with the binding uniformity decision, the binding decision of the UP, or the previous instruction. This mechanism ensures that through exercising the right to appeal, adjudication remains consistently uniform throughout the entire country. It is precisely in this way that conflicts between a UD and a CJEU ruling can be resolved in favor of EU law.

Conclusion

The UP does not “implement” or “transpose” the judgments of the CJEU. Nor does it assume an interpretative role. Under Article 267 TFEU, the power to define the content of Union law rests with the CJEU alone. The UP has a different task. Its role is to adapt the Hungarian precedent system when a binding decision of the Kúria collides with CJEU case law. In such situations, the UP declares that the earlier precedent no longer binds the courts. This does not change the meaning of EU law. It removes the domestic obstacle that would otherwise undermine its effect.

The logic is simple. The CJEU says what Union law means. The UP ensures that no conflicting precedent in Hungary continues to claim binding force. By extinguishing that force, the UP prevents legal uncertainty and protects the primacy of EU law. Seen this way, the UP neither applies nor interprets Union law. It operates entirely within the Hungarian constitutional framework. Its function is institutional, not doctrinal. It guarantees that the structure of Hungarian law does not obstruct the direct effect of EU norms.

The UP, therefore, does not “translate” CJEU judgments into Hungarian legal language. Instead, it works within the Hungarian precedent system to eliminate those binding domestic rules that would otherwise contradict the requirements of Union law.

Ádám Miklós Balássy is an adjunct / associate professor at the Jurisprudence Department of the Faculty of Law, Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary. His research focuses on Hungarian public administration, executive instruments, and legal theory.

[1] This article was originally published on Verfassungsblog on 24 September 2025 under the title “The Tarnkappe of Judgment”. It was later removed by the editors on the ground that the author, who also holds public office, did not indicate this in the original bio. The author, however, expressly rejects any conflation of his academic work with his public office. The article was modified only in minor grammatical and numerical points.